The Gulf War or Persian Gulf War

2 August 1990-28 February 1991

Was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force from 34 nations authorized by the United Nations (UN) and led primarily by the United States in order to return Kuwait to the control of the Emir of Kuwait. The conflict developed in the context of the Iran-Iraq War. The entry by Iraqi troops in Kuwait was met with immediate economic sanctions by some members of the UN Security Council against Iraq. The expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait began in January 1991 and was a decisive victory for the coalition forces, which took over Kuwait and entered Iraqi territory. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq, Kuwait, and bordering areas of Saudi Arabia. Iraq also launched missiles against targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel in retaliation for their support of the invading forces in Kuwait.

Since the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 had been called the "Gulf War" or "Persian Gulf War" by many news sources, the 1991 war has sometimes been called the Second Gulf War, but more commonly, the 1991 war is styled simply the Gulf War or the "First Gulf War", in distinction from the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. Operation Desert Storm was the U.S. name of the air and land operations and is often used to refer to the conflict.

Seven days after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (soon to be succeeded by John Major, who remained in that position for the rest of the war) pressured President George H.W. Bush into intervening in Kuwait and then the United States started to deploy Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, and Coast Guard units to Saudi Arabia (they called this Operation Desert Shield), while at the same time urging other countries to send their own forces to the scene. UN coalition-building efforts were so successful that by the time the fighting (Operation Desert Storm) began on January 17, 1991, twelve countries had sent naval forces, joining the regional states of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, as well as the huge array of the US Navy, which deployed six aircraft-carrier battle groups; eight countries had sent ground forces, joining the regional troops of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the seventeen heavy and six light brigades of the US Army and nine Marine regiments, with their large support and service forces; and four countries had sent combat aircraft, joining the local air forces of Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the US Air Force, US Navy, and U.S. Marine aviation, for a grand total of 2,430 fixed-wing aircraft.

Against them, the Iraqis had only a few gunboats and small missile craft to match the coalition's armada; but on the other hand, some 1.2 million ground troops with about 5,800 tanks, 5,100 other armored vehicles, and 3,850 artillery pieces made for a lot more strength on the ground . Iraq also had 750 fighters and bombers, 200 other aircraft, and elaborate missile and gun defenses.

Origins

Further information: Iraq-gate (Gulf War) To the U.S., Iran-Iraqi relations were stable, and Iraq had been chiefly an ally of the Soviet Union. The US was concerned with Iraq’s focus on Israel's Palestinian policies and its disapproval of moves toward peace between Israel and Egypt. It also disliked Iraqi support for various Arab and Palestinian militant groups such as Abu Nidal, which led to its inclusion on the incipient U.S. list of state sponsors of international terrorism on December 29, 1979. The US remained officially neutral during the outbreak of hostilities in the Iran-Iraq War, although it assisted Iraq covertly. In March 1982, however, Iran began a successful counteroffensive (Operation Undeniable Victory).

The US made a concerted effort to prevent Israel from getting involved so as not to inflame Arab countries angry with its policies. In a bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Ostensibly this was because of improvement in the regime’s record, although former United States Assistant Secretary of Defense Noel Koch later stated, "No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis'] continued involvement in terrorism... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran. "With Iran's newfound success in the war and its rebuff of a peace offer in July, arms sales to Iraq (which included poison gas which was then used against Iranian troops) from other states (most importantly the USSR, France, Egypt, and starting that year, the People's Republic of China) reached a record spike in 1982, but an obstacle remained to any potential US-Iraqi relationship — Abu Nidal continued to operate with official support in Baghdad. When Saddam Hussein expelled the group to Syria at the US' request in November 1983, the Reagan administration then sent Donald Rumsfeld to Saddam Hussein as a special envoy to cultivate ties.

Invasion of Kuwait

By the time the ceasefire with Iran was signed in August 1988, Iraq was virtually bankrupt and heavily indebted to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Its vulnerability was made worse because the following year, in open defiance of OPEC quotas, Kuwait had increased its oil production by 40 percent. The collapse in oil prices had a catastrophic impact on the Iraqi economy. The Iraqi government described it as a form of economic warfare, which it claimed was aggravated by Kuwait slant-drilling across the border into Iraq's Rumaila oil field.

Kuwait had been part of the Ottoman province of Basra, and although its ruling dynasty, the al-Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for its foreign affairs to Britain, it did not make any attempt to secede from the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, Iraqi governments had always refused to accept Kuwait's separation, and its borders were never clearly defined or mutually agreed. The British High Commissioner drew lines that deliberately constricted Iraq's access to the ocean so that any future Iraqi government would be in no position to threaten Britain's domination of the Gulf.

In late July 1990, as negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait stalled, Iraq massed troops on its border with the emirate and summoned US ambassador April Glaspie to a meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Two transcripts of that meeting have been produced, both of them controversial. In them, Saddam Hussein outlined his grievances against Kuwait, while promising that he would not invade Kuwait before one more round of negotiations. In the version published by The New York Times on September 23, 1990, Glaspie expressed concern over the troop buildup to Saddam Hussein:

"We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late ’60s. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via [Chadli] Klibi [then Arab League General Secretary] or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly. With regard to all of this, can I ask you to see how the issue appears to us?

"My assessment after 25 years' service in this area is that your objective must have strong backing from your Arab brothers. I now speak of oil. But you, Mr. President, have fought through a horrific and painful war. Frankly, we can see only that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the U.A.E. and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned. And for this reason, I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship -- not in the spirit of confrontation -- regarding your intentions. "I simply describe the position of my Government. And I do not mean that the situation is a simple situation. But our concern is a simple one."

Some have interpreted portions of these statements, particularly the language "We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait", as signaling an American "green light" for the invasion. Although the US State Department did not confirm (or deny) the authenticity of these transcripts, US sources say that it handled everything “by the book” (in accordance with the US' official neutrality on the Iraq-Kuwait issue) and had not signaled to Saddam Hussein any approval for defying the Arab League’s Jeddah crisis squad, which had conducted the negotiations. Many believe that Saddam Hussein may have been influenced by the perception that the US was not interested in the issue, (as they had not minded when he ordered the invasion of Iran) for which the Glaspie transcript is merely an example, and that he may have felt so in part because of U.S. support for the reunification of Germany, another act that he considered to be nothing more than the nullification of an artificial, internal border. Others, such as Kenneth Pollack, believe he had no such illusion, or that he simply underestimated the extent of a US response.

In November 1989, CIA director William Webster met with the Kuwaiti head of security, Brigadier Fahd Ahmed Al-Fahd. Subsequent to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Iraq claimed to have found a memorandum pertaining to their conversation. The Washington Post reported that Kuwait’s foreign minister fainted when confronted with this document at an Arab summit in August. Later, Iraq cited this memorandum as evidence of a CIA - Kuwaiti plot to destabilize Iraq economically and politically. The CIA and Kuwait have described the meeting as routine and the memorandum as a forgery. The purported document reads in part:

"We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country's government to delineate our common border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us on condition that such activities be coordinated at a high level."

Saddam Hussein detained several Westerners, with video footage being shown on state television.  On 23 August 1990 Saddam Hussein appeared on state television with Western hostages to whom he had refused exit visas. They were seen as human shields, though Saddam Hussein denied the claim. In the video he is seen ruffling the hair of a young boy named as Stuart Lockwood and asks through the interpreter if he is "getting his milk". He went on to say "We hope your presence as guests here will not be for too long. Your presence here, and in other places, is meant to prevent the scourge of war.

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